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Unintended Consequences for
Reversing Rapprochement: Is the US
Government Liable for a Loss of US
Property in Cuba?
ABSTRACT

In 2014, the United States announced a historic reopening
of ties with Cuba. This effort at rapprochement included restoring

diplomatic relations and easing regulatory restrictions to
facilitate greater business, trade, travel, and communication
between the two nations. However, the US government's decision
in 2017 to reverse course and reinstate the economic embargo
against Cuba could result in significant legal and financial

consequences for both US claimants who hold property in Cuba
and the US government. One issue that arises is whether US
corporations and individuals, who invested in property in Cuba
following

the

Obama-era

easing

of

restrictions,

have

a

constitutional right to just compensation for their loss. Under the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, if the government has

expropriated one's property, a claimant can allege a regulatory
taking and may seek fair compensation from the government. In

addition to direct takings of US property overseas, the Fifth
Amendment may have applications to takings by foreign
governments, and therefore there is the potential of a court
holding the United States liable for a foreign taking of US

property in Cuba. Finally, if a court concludes that a US
claimant has not demonstrated evidence of a foreign taking, there
for US claimants seeking
remain several alternatives
compensation for their property that has been seized, frozen, or
made inaccessible following the US regulatory shift preventing

trade and travel with Cuba.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a
historic reopening of ties between the United States and Cuba.' This
effort at rapprochement included plans to restore diplomatic relations

and ease regulatory restrictions to facilitate greater business, trade,

travel, and communication between the two nations. 2 Since 1962, an
economic embargo had prevented the routine flow of goods,
remittances, and people between the United States and Cuba. 3 The
trade embargo, which was implemented largely in an effort to suppress

and defeat the Castro regime, has a long and difficult history,
exacerbated by Cuba's policies that nationalized American-owned

1.
Matt Peppe, How Obama Could End the Cuban Embargo, COUNTERPUNCH
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/12/how-obama-could-end-thecuban-embargo/ [https://perma.cc/X9EX-8M95] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
2.

U.S.-Cuba

Relations,

COUNCIL

ON

FOREIGN

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations
(last updated
[https://perma.cc/T76D-TEYB (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
Id.
3.

RELATIONS,

Mar.

7,

2019)
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4
properties and raised tariffs on US imports. The initial embargo
received sustained support through ten US administrations until
President Obama took office.
When Presidents Obama and Raul Castro announced that their
governments would restore full diplomatic ties and begin plans to
liberalize trade and travel restrictions on Cuba, many US and
multinational firms immediately began making investments and
arranging business deals that would enable them to expand operations
5
in Cuba as the market opened up to the United States. Substantial

business

and investment

opportunities

developed

across

many

industries, particularly in the travel, telecommunications, and
agricultural sectors, as new policies favored such investments by
reducing regulatory barriers and liberalizing market access between
the two nations.6 However, when President Donald Trump was elected
in November 2016, his administration quickly reversed many of these
Obama-era policies. 7 The policy shift left in its wake nonviable
investments in Cuban property by US firms, like Google and Marriott
Hotels, who had not expected that their ventures in Cuba would
become frozen, and those economic interests potentially extinguished
by future presidential administrations. 8
President Trump's policy reversal, which channels US economic
activities away from the Cuban government, had the practical effect of
slowing down US business activities in Cuba, and for some US firms,
9
the shift completely deprived them of their property in Cuba.
Corporations like AT&T and Starwood Resorts were suddenly unable
to utilize their property or manage existing investments, despite
regulatory assurances made during the Obama administration.10

4.
See id.; see also Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General
Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year
Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901 (1995).
Anya Landau French et al., US Investment Climate in Cuba May Be
5.
2018),
20,
(Aug.
REV.
BUs.
DAILY
LAW.cOM:
Improving,
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/08/20/us-investment-climate-in-cubamay-be-improving/ [https://perma.cc/5AY2-KCTW] (archived Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter
Cuba Investment Climate].
U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
6.
7.
See Jon Lee Anderson, Cuba's Next Transformation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/sunday/cubas-next2019),
transformation.html [https://perma.cc/9TY2-PD5X] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
See Alan Gomez, Google Inks Deal with Cuba to Speed Up Internet Service,
8.
2016),
12,
(Dec.
TODAY
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/12/12/google-cuba-sign-deal-speedup-internet-service/95337148/ [https://perma.cc/V8AL-JSN9] (archived Oct. 24, 2019);
This New Luxury Hotel in Havana Is Making U.S.-Cuba History, FORTUNE (June 28,
https://fortune.com/2016/06/28/sheraton-hotel-havana-cuba/
2016),
[https://perma.cc/2CG6-R6KQ] (archived Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Marriott Hotel in
Havana].
See Anderson, supra note 7.
9.
See Danny King, Starwood, Marriottget government approvalfor Cuba hotels,
10.
TRAVEL WKLY. (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Hotel-News/
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Herein lies a potential constitutional challenge against the US
government. The constitutional right to private property, and its
underlying protection, is often challenged under the "takings clause" of
the Fifth Amendment, which states that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation."1 1 A takings claim
provides US nationals legal footing to challenge the US government
over their lost property, if a claimant has not been adequately
compensated.1 2 To determine whether a government action constitutes
a Fifth Amendment taking, courts conduct a two-part analysis: first, a
trial court determines whether the claimant has identified a cognizable
property interest under the Fifth Amendment that is the subject of the
taking, and then, if it finds that a cognizable property interest exists,
it considers whether that property interest was taken by the
government.
The Supreme Court has held that if the government expropriated
one's property, a takings action may be justified against the United
States and the claimant may seek his constitutional right to just
compensation.1 3 But what specific government action effectively
amounts to a taking presents a challenging question, and thus is a
central issue as it pertains to property in Cuba.1 4 By expanding the
jurisprudence around a takings claim to include "regulatory takings,"
the court has recognized that regulatory interferences with property
rights can have severe economic effects for property owners to the same
degree as appropriations and physical invasions of land, effectively
depriving the owner of the utility or value of that property.1 5 Moreover,
because courts have found that Fifth Amendment protections can
apply outside the United States, the regulation of non-real-estate
property, including by means of an embargo, has prompted fresh and

[https://perma.cc/EMF5Starwood-Marriott-get-government-approval-for-Cuba-hotels
SJ45] (archived Oct. 24, 2019); Aishwarya Venugopal, AT&T Signs Deal to Offer
Roaming Services in Cuba, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/uscuba-usa-at-t/att-signs-deal-to-offer-roaming-services-in-cuba-idUSKCN10X1RO
[https://perma.cc/VBE4-XG4P] (archived Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Venugopal, AT&T
Deal].
11.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Remsen M. Kinne, Note, Making America Pay: Just Compensation for
12.
ForeignProperty Takings, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 217, 218-19 (1989).
13.
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 514-15 (1883).
14.
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a
regulatory act constitutes a taking which requires just compensation depending on the
extent of diminution in the value of the property).
15.
See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., 97-112, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 1 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-

122.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMP9-CED2] (archived Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter SCOTUS
TAKINGS DECISIONS]. Regulatory takings are those in which a government regulation
limits the use of private property to such a degree that the regulation effectively deprives
a property owner of economically reasonable use or value of his property to such an
extent that it deprives him of utility or value of that property. Id.
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heightened scrutiny of government conduct as it relates to private
property.' 6

Courts have held that Fifth Amendment protections can apply
extraterritorially.1 7 In particular, a taking prompted by a foreign
government constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation if the claimant

can demonstrate that the taking was done on behalf of the US
government. 18 But, the Fifth Amendment can also support a takings
claim where the seizure of property abroad by a foreign government

does not necessarily lead to the US government acquiring a possessory
interest in the property.1 9 The Fifth Amendment's scope has been
20
This
extended to include "indirect" takings by foreign governments.
suggests that the United States can be liable for a foreign taking (and
just compensation) simply by encouraging foreign sovereigns to adopt

domestic policies or programs that result in the seizure of a US
claimant's property. 2 1 Accordingly, this Note examines the modern

frameworks utilized by US courts to determine if a foreign taking has
occurred, and then applies various judicial tests to determine whether

US property losses in Cuba constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. It is
also important to consider whether a taking exists in cases where the
US government has extinguished a claimant's "live expropriation
action" against a foreign government, as this would allow the claimant
22
to seek just compensation.
In the context of this policy dilemma, US investors and
corporations must put forth enough proof to establish that US
government involvement in the foreign expropriation was "sufficiently
direct and substantial." 23 If there is clear evidence that the Cuban
government seized or froze US citizens' property at the prompting of
the US government or another foreign sovereign, this may confirm a
Fifth Amendment taking in the eyes of the court.24 However, if the US

government can show that its policy changes do not amount to a clearcut taking and are nonjusticiable questions, then it will be difficult, if

16.
See id.
See, e.g., Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see
17.
also Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
See Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464 (The Philippine government seized a US
18.
corporation's radar equipment located in the Philippines. Pursuant to a takings claim,
the Court of Claims in Turney awarded the corporation just compensation because the
court found that foreign sovereigns may be considered "agents" of the U.S. in foreign
takings actions.).
Kinne, supra note 12, at 222-23.
19.
20.
Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
21.
See id. (noting there is nothing to suggest that the United States cannot be
held responsible for an expropriation of US citizens' property abroad by a foreign
sovereign, but finding that in this case US involvement was insufficient to render
liability for a "taking").
See Kinne, supra note 12, at 238 n.138 (citing Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573).
22.
23.
Id. at 238 (quoting Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571.
24.
See id.
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not impossible, for US property holders to demonstrate the existence
of a regulatory taking for a foreign expropriation of property in Cuba.
If US claimants cannot successfully meet this burden in a US

court, the best course of action may be to litigate their claim under the
Helms-Burton Act of 1996. Title III of Helms-Burton extended the
territorial application of the embargo to apply to foreign companies
trading with Cuba.25 The act permits US companies and individuals to
seek compensation in US federal court against those trafficking in
expropriated property taken by the Cuban government.2 6 Title III also
covers property formerly owned by Cubans who have since become US
citizens. 27 Alternatively, a US citizen seeking compensation could
lobby the US government to negotiate with the expropriating country
for an award on its behalf,2 8 or can pursue a local action against the
foreign sovereign for just compensation in cash. 2 9 Both approaches
may be available to US property owners alleging a taking in Cuba. This

Note explores each of these solutions in more depth and considers other
remedies available to property owners in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.3 0
While this Note discusses the United States' trade embargo with
Cuba and examines the scope of a foreign taking, the determination of
whether the embargo amounts to a constitutional taking-as a result
of the government's decision to restore the embargo in 2017-may also
have consequences for future US government actions. If a Fifth
Amendment claim exists as a result of its regulatory action, the United
States will undoubtedly face future takings challenges stemming from
its policies or the policies of other sovereigns. In addition, any litigation
that results from this shift in policy could have a considerable impact

25.
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton), Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000)).
26.
Id. § 302.
27. Id. § 303.
28. See Shanghai Power. Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 249 (1983), aff'd 765
F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29.
See Kinne, supra note 12, at 223.
30.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, formerly called the Claims Court, is the
definitive arbiter of the Constitution's guarantee that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation" (Fifth Amendment takings claims).
Claimants seeking monetary compensation for a foreign taking in the Court of Claims
must satisfy the requirements of the Tucker Act, which grants the court special
jurisdiction to hear those claims against the US government defined by Congress. Under
the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims is responsible for determining whether the
government's regulatory act constituted a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment-a
factual inquiry-and deciding appropriate compensation liability. See Roger J. Marzulla
& Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court:Adjusting
the Burdens That in Fairness and Equity Ought to Be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40
CATH. U. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1991). The Claims Court shares jurisdiction with US
district courts for claims up to $10,000, but has exclusive jurisdiction for claims in excess
of that amount. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2013). Because the Court of Claims lacks the
authority to grant declaratory or injunctive relief, any foreign takings claim for equitable
relief is thus removed from the court's jurisdiction. See Kinne, supra note 12, at 245.
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on future decisions and might well result in the United States needing
to consider the impact and costs of future takings challenges when
deciding whether to adopt certain policy or regulatory actions.
This Note critically examines several property investments made
in Cuba -by various US corporations following President Obama's

decision to ease trade restrictions and lift the economic embargo and
whether the subsequent loss of investment opportunities under the
Trump administration may amount to a taking by the US
government. 31 Part II of this Note discusses the history of the United
States' trade embargo against Cuba, focusing on its expansion during
several US administrations. This section concludes with a discussion
of the takings doctrine and its application extraterritorially. Part III
analyzes foreign takings jurisprudence and the necessary elements for

a successful claim and examines the remedies available to claimants.
Part IV suggests that US corporations may be able to bring a Fifth
Amendment takings claim as a result of their lost investments and the
government's expropriation of future opportunities to use their

property, and also proposes various alternative legal solutions for other
US claimants with property rights in Cuba. Lastly, Part V considers

the policy implications of this Note and provides a brief conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The US Trade Embargo Against Cuba: from Past to Present

Cuba, the island nation located only ninety miles south of
Florida's coast, has a long and at times tumultuous relationship with
the United States. Over the last sixty years, the United States-Cuba
relationship has largely been shaped by a sustained trade embargo
levied against Cuba that was imposed after the ascendency of the
Castro regime. 3 2 On January 1, 1959, a group of Cuban revolutionaries
overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista, a regime supported by

the United States, and established a socialist state closely allied with
the Soviet Union.3 3 The following year in October 1960, the US
government blocked all oil exports to Cuba, leaving the regime of Fidel

In the context of the embargo, the total amount of money, real property and
31.
business opportunities lost as a result of this change in policy remains unknown. This
Note merely makes the case that such business losses exist, and in response, considers
whether such monetary loss or deprivation of real property can be litigated by US
claimants and compensated under a Fifth Amendment takings claim.
32.
An embargo is a government order that restricts commerce or the exchange
of goods with a specific country, often designed to isolate a country politically and
economically, and create difficulties for its governing regime. See Daniel Liberto, An
26,
2019),
(Jun.
INVESTOPEDIA
Defined,
Embargo
[https://perma.cc/J5MN-EDTV]
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/embargo.asp
(archived Oct. 24, 2019).
33.
U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
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Castro dependent on Soviet crude oil, which American firms on the
island refused to refine. 34 In response, the Cuban government
nationalized all American-owned oil refineries in - Cuba without
compensation. 3 5 This action prompted the US government to place an
embargo on all exports to Cuba, except for food and medicine. 36 The
Castro regime responded by nationalizing American businesses and a
majority of the privately owned American properties on the island. 3 7
Despite these takings of American assets and property by the Cuban
government, no compensation was issued for the seizures. 38 By 1961,
Cuba and the United States severed diplomatic relations and the
Eisenhower administration severely restricted travel from the United
States to Cuba. 39 Shortly thereafter, on February 7, 1962, President
John F. Kennedy expanded the terms of the embargo to ban nearly all
Cuban trade and imports, including products completed or assembled

outside of Cuba.4 0
In the years that followed, the United States maintained the trade
embargo with Cuba. In 1963, the Kennedy administration issued the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, new economic sanctions that froze
Cuban assets in the United States. 4 1 Despite a brief easing of
restrictions under the Carter administration, President Reagan
restored the economic embargo in 1982.42 Subsequently, the HelmsBurton Act of 1996 reaffirmed the trade embargo on Cuba and

broadened its scope to include foreign companies trading with Cuba.4 3
The act penalized companies that do business with Cuba by preventing
them from transacting in the United States.4 4 The basis for this
restriction was that foreign companies transacting with Cuba were
"trafficking" in stolen American-owned properties confiscated by Cuba
after the revolution, and thus should be excluded from conducting
business in the United States.45 The law also included a provision
establishing civil liability in US courts for any person or company,

foreign or domestic, trafficking in confiscated property claimed by US

34.
Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and
Terrorism: US v. Cuba, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L EcoN. 1(2011) [hereinafter U.S.-Cuba
Sanctions].
35.
Peppe, supranote 1.
36.
U.S.-Cuba Sanctions, supra note 34.
37.
Peppe, supranote 1.
38.
Kevin J. Fandl, Trading with the Enemy: Opening the Door to U.S. Investment
in Cuba, 49 GEO. J. INT'L L. 563, 588 (2018).
39.
U.S.-Cuba Sanctions, supra note 34.
40.
U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
41.
Fandl, supra note 38, at 569.
42.
See U.S.-Cuba Sanctions, supra note 34, at 3-4.
43.
Id. at 8-9.
44. Id.
45.
The Helms-Burton Act defines "confiscation" to include any property seized
by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, without adequate compensation or
permission of the owner or the claim being settled by an appropriate settlement
procedure. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4) (2018).
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citizens. 46 While the embargo was slightly relaxed in 2000 to permit

the

export

of

agricultural

products

and

medicine

to

Cuba

for humanitarian purposes, 4 7 Congress maintained its strong support

for the policy and the embargo remained largely intact over the course
of ten US administrations. 4 8

B. The Obama Administration'sEasingof Trade Restrictions on Cuba
and the Resulting Investment Deals During the Obama-Era
In December 2014, President Obama, the eleventh president to
deal with the trade embargo, declared intentions to normalize bilateral
49
relations and restore full diplomatic ties with the island nation.
During his first term in office, President Obama eased restrictions on

remittances and travel, and loosened sanctions in other areas. 50 The
new Cuban government under Raul Castro also signaled a willingness
to liberalize and relax restrictions on some sectors of Cuba's largely

state-run economy, such as agriculture and small businesses. 51 These
changes formed the blueprint to restoring diplomatic relations between
the two countries. The effort included new policies to loosen economic
regulations that would facilitate increased travel, commerce, and the
free flow of information to, and within, Cuba.5 2 For example, the US:,
government eased travel restrictions, authorized commercial US
airlines to offer service to Cuba, raised limits on remittances, allowed
US financial institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban
financial institutions to process merchant and other transactions, and
permitted several other activities to reduce regulatory barriers to
providing financial, manufacturing, telecommunications, and shipping
services.5 3 The two governments also reopened their embassies in
Havana and Washington, D.C. 54 Notably, however, the United States

46.
Id.; see also Fandl, supra note 38, at 588-89.
47.
See generally Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-71 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211
(2012)).
48.
Greg Myre, The U.S. and Cuba: A Brief History of a Complicated
Relationship,
NAT'L
PUB.
RADIO
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/12/17/371405620/the-u-s-and-cuba-a-briefhistory-of-a-tortured-relationship [https://perma.cc/F8FS-3SFF] (archived Oct. 24,

2019).
See U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
49.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury and Commerce Announce
52.
Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions (Jan. 15, 2015) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Treasury Press Release].
53.
Id.
U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
54.
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did not lift the trade embargo outright, despite requests by President
Obama and many members of Congress.5 5
The government's announcement to loosen restrictions on trade
and travel with Cuba was met with enthusiasm by tourists and
businesses. US and other multinational corporations launched
immediate efforts to gain a foothold in the Cuban market and begin
dealings as soon as politically feasible. 56 With the opening of Cuba's
market, there existed significant opportunities to expand business
operations and make new investments, particularly for businesses in
the hotel, airline, cruise line, telecommunications, and agricultural
sectors.5 7 While many of these corporations were newcomers to Cuba,
several industries and companies operated extensively throughout
Cuba prior to the rise of Fidel Castro's regime and the nationalization
of US assets in Cuba. 5 8 In fact, when Castro came to power in 1959, a
number of key portions of the Cuban economy were primarily under
the control of US corporations, including a significant share of the
island's natural resources, railroads, and farmland. 59
In response to the Obama administration's shifting Cuba policy,

US firms made sizeable economic investments in or relating to Cuba.
For example, Carnival Cruise Line gained approval in May 2016 to sail
from Miami to Havana, allowing travelers to sail aboard one of
Carnival's cultural exchange programs to visit Cuba. 60 The

announcement came "only hours after President Obama shook hands
with Cuban president Raul Castro during President Obama's historic
visit to the island." 61 However, approval from the Cuban government
depended on examining and refining infrastructure at the island's
ports to support cruise ships. 6 2 Carnival was required to transfer its
smaller seven hundred-passenger ship from the United Kingdom

because it was one of the only ships small enough to dock at Havana's
ports. 63 In addition, American Express announced plans under the new
regulations to expand its business operations into Cuba for the first

55.
See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by President Obama to the
People of Cuba at Gran Teatro de la Habana (Mar. 22, 2016) (transcript available with
the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House) ("As President of the United States,
I've called on our Congress to lift the embargo.").
56.
See Gomez, supra note 8; MarriottHotel in Havana, supra note 8.
57.
See U.S.-Cuba Relations, supra note 2.
58.
See Ashley Morales, The Future of U.S. Claims for Property Restoration in
Cuba, 24 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 165 (2017); Cuban Claims FAQs,
CERTIFIED CUBAN CLAIMS, http://www.certifiedcubanclaims.org/faqs.htm

(last visited

Jan. 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PN5R-KGQ5] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
59.
Fandl, supra note 38, at 572-73.
60.
Chabeli Herrera, Carnival Gets Approval to Start Cruising from Miami to
Cuba
in
May,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
23,
2016),
https://www. miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article67400067.html
[https://perma.cc/QU2G-UL7J] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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time. 64 Prior to the policy shift, American Express-a US companywas barred from doing business in Cuba.6 5 But under the new
guidelines, American Express began allowing US travelers to use its
credit and debit cards on the island and launched a program that

permitted US banks to open correspondent accounts in Cuba to process
certain transactions. 66
In another example, AT&T made investments to offer roaming
services in the Cuban market, becoming the third US wireless carrier,
after Verizon and Sprint, to provide such services in Cuba. 67 In August

2016,

AT&T

signed

a

deal

with

Cuba's

state-owned

telecommunications provider, Empresa De Telecomunicaciones De
Cuba (ETECSA), to offer direct roaming services to customers in or
visiting Cuba, which would reduce the costs of calls between the United
States and Cuba for the telecommunication giant. 68 Additionally,
state-run
Cuba's
with
an
agreement
signed
Google
telecommunications company in 2016 to boost Internet and broadband
69
This
access for Cubans using YouTube and other Google products.
deal was announced by President Obama during his historic visit to
the island nation. 7 0 The expansion of business ventures continued even
after the close of the Obama administration. Google invested in several
submarine cables to expand its connectivity and internet services on
7
the island even after President Trump had been elected. 1 Each of
these regulatory-backed investments and ventures was launched in
reliance upon, and as a result of, President Obama's policy shift that

opened Cuba to US travelers and businesses.
C. The Trump Administration's Tightening of Trade Restrictions
After assuming office in January 2017, President Donald Trump
began to reverse key actions taken by the Obama administration that
had liberalized trade with Cuba, with the prospect that further roll
back of Obama-era policies might occur. Under new restrictions that
took effect in November 2017, the Trump administration retightened

64.
Mimi Whitefield, American Express Says Si to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 27,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article8409144.html
2015),
[https://perma.cc/GL9U-HE4G] (archived Nov. 3, 2019).
65.
Id.
Id.
66.
Venugopal, AT&T Deal, supra note 10.
67.
68.
Id.
69.
See Gomez, supra note 8.
70.
Melissa Chan, Google Set to Expand Internet Access in Cuba, Obama Says,
https://time.com/4265721/google-cuba-obama-internet/
2016),
21,
(Mar.
TIME
[https://perma.cc/QU43-RHYT] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
71. Nora Gtmez Torres, Google and Cuba Close to Finalizing Agreement to
Expand Internet Access on the Island, MIAMI HERALD (June 6, 2018),
https://www. miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article2126605
49.html [https://perma.cc/7TZ4-FHZV] (archived Oct. 24, 2019).
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the economic embargo by banning US firms and citizens from doing
business with dozens of entities tied to Cuba's military, intelligence,
and security agencies. 72 The regulatory restrictions were applied to
stores, hotels, marinas, tourist agencies, and rum factories frequently
visited by Americans; all of these became off-limits to Americans
because they are owned by or associated with the Cuban government. 73
The changes also ended "people-to-people" visas, which had allowed US
travelers to visit Cuba without authorized tour operators, and
restricted educational visas. 74
In channeling economic activities away from entities connected to

the Cuban government, the practical effect of this policy shift for US
businesses was a slowdown, if not a complete shutdown, of their
investments in Cuba. 75 The regulatory change came as a surprise to

many US firms that did not expect their business interests to be linked
to Cuba's governmental agencies, such as the state's national policethe investigative arm of Cuba's navy and border patrol agents. 76 For
example, CleBer LLC, a United States-based company that

manufactures tractors, built a small rear-engine tractor that it planned
to sell to nongovernmental farming co-ops and independent farmers in

Cuba's countryside-the first effort of its kind in Cuba. 77 In early 2016,
the U.S. Department of the Treasury granted the company a license to

72.

List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba, U.S. DEP'T

OF STATE, BUREAU OF EcON. & BUs. AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.state.gov/cuba-

sanctions/cuba-restricted-list/list-of-restricted-entities-and-subentities-associated-withcuba-as-of-november-9-2017/ [https://perma.cc/E6CN-ZZBL] (archived Nov. 3, 2019).
73.
See id.
74. Alan Gomez, Trump Cracks Down on U.S. Business and Travel to Cuba, USA
TODAY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/08/trumpcracks-down-u-s-business-and-travelcuba/843419001/
[https://perma.cc/Y2MS-LWBZ]
(archived Oct. 24, 2019).
75.
See Rebecca Bill Chavez, Trump's Cuba Sanctions Are a Mistake, FOREIGN
POL'Y (May 3, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/trumps-cuba-sanctions-are-amistake/ [https://perma.cc/XU72-2JNG] (archived Oct. 24, 2019) (explaining that
President Trump's decision to expand sanctions on Cuba represents a strategic error that
will "alienate U.S. partners in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, harm U.S.
businesses, and strangle Cuba's emerging private sector.").
76.
See List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba, supra
note 72.
77.
Richard Stradling, They built a tractor for Cubanfarmers, but others will use
it
instead,
NEWS
&
OBSERVER
(May
17,
2018),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article211110089.html
[https://perma.cc/2GZY-H9W5] (archived Oct. 24, 2019). Co-founded by a Cuban
American, CleBer was the first US company to be issued a license from the U.S. Office
of Foreign Assets Control and the Commerce Department for a manufacturing project in
Cuba after President Obama announced rapprochement between the two countries in
2014. On his visit to Cuba in March 2016, President Obama announced that CleBer "will
be the first US company to build a factory here in more than 50 years." Mimi Whitefield,
Alabama Company Says Cuba Needs Its Tractors, But Approval Process Is Slow, MIAMI
HERALD
(Apr.
26,
2016),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article74025982.html
[https://perma.cc/L4FM-862N]
(archived Oct. 18, 2019).
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do business and lease property in Cuba under an exception to the US

trade embargo created by the Obama administration. 78 But in 2018,
frustrated with the recent American policy shift that restricted trade
and commercial opportunities between the two countries, Cuba blocked
CleBer from assembling the tractors in Cuba, and implied that CleBer
could build and sell its tractors in Cuba only after the United States

lifts the economic embargo. 79
In addition to tightening trade and travel restrictions on US

entities, the U.S. Department of State published a new list of 180
prohibited companies, hotels, and stores controlled by the Cuban
80
As part of the new
military that were now off-limits to Americans.
Trump policy toward Cuba, "no American citizen, firm, green-card
holder or person otherwise under US jurisdiction is allowed to carry
81
The
out direct financial transactions with any entity on the list."
administration's investment restrictions specifically target the
business arm of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (GAESA)-a
Cuban conglomerate involved in all sectors of the economy and

spearheaded by General Luis Alberto Rodriguez, the son-in-law of
former Cuban President Raul Castro. 82 This recent policy shift has
limited new US investments on the island and has damaged proengagement efforts by businesses that flocked to the "new Cuba" in

search of new opportunities following the recent thaw in relations.8 3

One example of this downturn is in the Cuban hotel industry:
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, which is owned by Marriott
International, Inc. and headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut, had
signed a deal to manage a state-owned Gaviota hotel in Havana under

78.
79.
80.

Stradling, supra note 77.
Id.
List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba, supra note

72.
Mimi Whitefield, Has President Trump's Year-old Cuba Policy Helped the
81.
Cuban People?, MIAMI HERALD (June 14, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
[https://perma.cc/HS4Hnation-world/world/americas/cuba/article212497419.htm
RDKS] (archived Oct. 18, 2019).
82. GAESA, the Spanish acronym for Grupo de AdministracidnEmpresarialS.A.,
is the business branch of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces and controls more than
fifty enterprises. GAESA operates in virtually every area of the Cuban economy,
controlling hotel chains, car rental agencies, banks, credit card services, remittances,
supermarkets, clothing shops, real estate development companies, gasoline stations,
import and export companies, shipping and construction companies, warehouses, and
airlines. See Nora Gdmez Torres, High On Cuba Policy Proposal: Restricting U.S.
Business Deals With Cuba's Military-Run Entities, MIAMI HERALD (June 12, 2017),
7 72
4
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article155
69.html [https://perma.ccIV7SC-DZ7G] (archived Oct. 18, 2019).
83. Marc Frank, CubanMilitary's Tentacles Reach Deep Into Economy, REUTERS,
June 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-military/cuban-militarys[https://perma.cc/L67K-X93S]
tentacles-reach-deep-into-economy-idUSKBN1962VK
(archived Oct. 24, 2019).
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the Sheraton brand. 84 The oceanfront hotel opened in 2016 under the
label "Four Points by Sheraton." 85 Gaviota, like many other hotel and
tourism development projects in Havana, is part of GAESA and
operates almost exclusively under its control. As a result of the US
government's recent ban, Starwood Hotels was forced to suspend its

business venture and will need to look elsewhere for another partner
if it wishes to unite with Cuban hotels in the future. 86 Similarly, U.S.
Gulf Coast ports and the Virginia Port Authority, which signed letters
of intent in January 2016 to work with the Cuban National Port
Authority on its newly opened Port of Mariel container terminal, will
likely be forced to walk away from its shipping partnership, since the
Cuban port is also controlled by GAESA. 87 The port terminal-visited
by several US business delegations in 2015 after the easing of trade
and travel restrictions-feeds Cuba's surrounding special development
zone, which allows investors 100 percent ownership. 88 The slowdown
in United States-Cuba trade relations, as a result of both travel and
helps explain the loss of investment
business restrictions,
opportunities in Cuba following the Trump administration's new Cuba
policy and regulatory barriers. This loss of expectation-backed
investments has certainly had undesirable financial consequences for
companies like Marriott and many others and raises the considerable
possibility of a Fifth Amendment takings claim against the US
government in regard to these consequences.
As recently as October 2019, the Trump administration continued
to tighten sanctions on Cuba's economy. The U.S. Department of
Commerce announced that it will further restrict the Cuban regime's
access to commercial aircraft and other goods containing US content,
including revoking existing aircraft lease licenses. 89 This will have
implications for US airliners and other domestic operators.

84.
Lenore Adkins, Starwood's Deal in Cuba Encourages Would-Be Investors,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(May
31,
2016),
https://www.engagecuba.org/engagementions/2016/5/31/starwoods-deal-in-cuba-encourages-would-be-investors
[https://perma.cc/7NKB-BGFP] (archived Oct. 24, 2019). See also Marriott Hotel in
Havana, supra note 8.
85. Adkins, supra note 84.
List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba, supra note
86.
72.
Frank, supra note 83.
87.
88.
Press Release, Office of Va. Governor Terry McAuliffe (Jan. 5, 2016) (on file
with the Virginia Maritime Association).
Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Department of Commerce
89.
Further
Tightens
Cuba
Sanctions
(Oct.
18,
2019),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-commercefurther-tightens-cuba-sanctions [https://perma.cc/UZ8X-9KUB] (archived Jan. 17, 2020).
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III. THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE

A. The Takings Clause and its Application Extraterritorially
As a direct result of undoing the Obama-era trade and economic
policies towards Cuba, access to many of the US investment-backed

business projects, as well as to the actual physical assets (i.e., real
property), in Cuba became blocked. Whether this loss of access to
property and investment interests as a result of this policy reversal can
amount to a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment is
90
considered here.
The right to have private property is protected under the U.S.
Constitution, and the loss of such property to public use is often
challenged under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provision.

The clause states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation." 91 Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court

limited takings claims only to condemnation (also called "formal
condemnation")-the government's formal exercise of its eminent
domain power to take property coercively, upon payment of just
92
compensation to the property owner. In a condemnation action, there
is no issue as to whether the property is "taken" in the Fifth
Amendment sense; the government concedes as much by filing the
action. The only "taking" question is what constitutes "just
93
compensation" in each case.
However, over time the U.S. Supreme Court began finding
compensable takings among a broader set of claims. The court held
that government expropriation or physical invasion of one's propertyfor instance, when a government dam floods private land and causes
constitute a "taking" akin to formal condemnation of
damage 94-does

that property by the government. 95 In such cases, the court has
permitted property owners to preserve and redress their constitutional
right to compensation by bringing a takings action against the
government, rather than requiring the government to initiate the suit
96
Accordingly, the
as occurs under formal condemnation actions.
central issue in takings claims is whether the impact of the
government action on a particular property amounts to a taking in the
constitutional sense. If a taking is found, only then, of course, does the
question of just compensation arise.

&

See infra Part IV.
90.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See SCOTUS TAKINGS DEcISIONS, supra note 15, at 1.
92.
See id.
93.
94. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 514-15 (1883). See also Ark. Game
Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32, 38 (2012) (holding that temporary
government-induced flooding is not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability).
See SCOTUS TAKINGS DECISIONS, supra note 15, at 1.
95.
See, e.g., Jones, 109 U.S. at 513.
96.
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In the landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the
Supreme Court expanded the application of takings claims from
government appropriations and physical invasions of property to
include the mere regulation of property use. 97 By expanding its takings
jurisprudence to include "regulatory takings," the court recognized
that regulatory interferences with property rights can have economic
and other consequences for property owners to the same degree as
formal appropriations and physical invasions of land.9 8 Under this
framework for example, frequent flights by military aircraft over

private land at low altitude constitute regulatory takings because such
flights amount to direct and immediate interference with the use and
enjoyment of one's land, thereby effecting a taking.99 Moreover, under
the broader takings doctrine announced in Pennsylvania Coal,
temporary seizure and operation of a coal mine by the US government
during wartime (in an effort to avert a coal miners' strike) amounted
to a regulatory taking in the court's eyes because the government
asserted total dominion and control over the mines. 100

The concept of a regulatory taking expanded the availability of
new legal actions for property owners and underlies many of the
Supreme Court's takings decisions over the last fifty years. One
notable case in which the court attempted to chart a clear framework
for analyzing regulatory takings was Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. New York City, where the court declared that whether a regulatory
taking has occurred depends on weighing three principal factors: (1)

the economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with a property owner's distinct investment-

backed expectations,

and (3) the "character" of the government

action. 10 1 The growth and number of regulatory takings claims is
hardly surprising, especially given its application to comprehensive
federal and local zoning ordinances, wildlife habitat preservation,
drilling and mining restrictions, and wetlands and coastal
regulations.1 02 Most importantly, the regulation of non-real-estate
property, including by means of a trade embargo, has prompted fresh

97.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
98.
See SCOTUS TAKINGS DECISIONS, supra note 15, at 1.
99. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946) (holding that frequent
military aircraft flights over a property owner's chicken farm at low altitude constituted
a regulatory taking); see also Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 85 (1962)
(holding that low and frequent flights over a home near the county-owned airport
amounted to a taking of an air easement, with the county, rather than United States,
assuming compensatory liability).
100. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116 (1951).
101. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). For a
more thorough discussion and analysis of Penn Central and its application to land use
regulations, see Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and The Limits of Land Use
Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1222, 1229 (2009).
102. See, e.g., SCOTUS TAKINGS DECISIONS, supra note 15, at 1-2.
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and heightened scrutiny of government conduct as it relates to private
property.
But does the takings clause apply extraterritorially, and is there

a constitutional guarantee that the US government compensate
individuals whose property was taken outside the United States?

Courts have held that Fifth Amendment protections do apply to
property located abroad.1 03 Since World War II, US property owners
have brought claims for takings arising in foreign countries and have

received compensation from the US government.1 04 In particular, a
taking prompted by a foreign government constitutes a Fifth
Amendment violation if the claimant can prove that the taking was
done on behalf of the US government. 105 Further, the Fifth
Amendment can also protect a taking where the seizure of property

overseas by a foreign government does not necessarily lead to the US
0 6 In
government acquiring a possessory interest in that property.
Langenegger v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit recognized that the United States could be liable for a
compensatory taking by "encouraging the El Salvadorian government
to implement a land reform program resulting in seizure of the

claimant's plantation." 107 The court thereby extended the scope of the

,

Fifth Amendment to include "indirect" takings and suggested that in
certain circumstances the US government's participation in a foreign
sovereign's policymaking activity may be sufficient to constitute a
regulatory taking.1 08 Accordingly, a takings claim may arise from
foreign expropriation of property, if it is established that such takings
would not have occurred but for the United States' direct or indirect
policymaking involvement in the overseas expropriation. 109

103. Kinne, supra note 12, at 218; see also infra Part flI.B.
104. See Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953); see also
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
105. See Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464 (The Philippine government seized a US
corporation's radar equipment located in the Philippines and turned it over to the United
States. Pursuant to a takings claim, the Court of Claims awarded the corporation just
compensation because the court found that foreign sovereigns may be considered
"agents" of the US in foreign takings actions.).
106. Kinne, supra note 12, at 222.
107. Id. at 223 (citing Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)).
108. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72 (noting the United States can be held
responsible for an expropriation of US citizens' property by a foreign sovereign but
finding nonetheless that US involvement in this case was insufficient to constitute
liability for a takings action).
109. See id. at 1571 ("When considering a possible taking, the focus is not on the
acts of others, but on whether sufficient direct and substantial United States
involvement exists.") (emphasis removed); see also infra Part III.A.
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B. The Basis of a Foreign Taking: JudicialFrameworksfor
Evaluating a Taking of US PropertyAbroad
1. The LangeneggerTest
The question of foreign takings arose as a byproduct of America's
efforts to influence political outcomes and policymaking decisions in
foreign jurisdictions (particularly developing countries), through which
the United States was involved in the destruction or seizure of private

property. 110 Consequently, US courts have steadily broadened the
definition and scope of a foreign taking. As noted in Langenegger, US
citizens brought a takings action against the US government in the
Court of Claims to recover the value of their land in El Salvador, which
the Salvadoran government expropriated pursuant to an agrarian land
reform program.11 1 The claimants contended that the Salvadoran
government expropriated their farmland at the prompting of US
government officials in exchange for US military and economic
support, and thus the United States should be liable for providing just
compensation to the claimants under the Fifth Amendment.1 12 On the
takings question, the Court of Claims held that the seizure of plaintiffs'
land by the government of El Salvador did not support a takings claim
against the United States, and the United States only derived an

incidental benefit. 11 3 Reviewing the lower court's decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the case did present
a justiciable question, 114 but ultimately determined that the US
government's support for El Salvador's land reform program did not
give rise to takings liability on the part of the United States.115
Importantly, the Federal Circuit's holding in Langenegger
articulated a new judicial approach and standard by which to evaluate
whether a foreign taking of US citizens' property abroad has
occurred.11 6 On the issue of just compensation, the court specified that
a claimant must demonstrate that the US government had "sufficiently
direct and substantial involvement" in a foreign expropriation in order

110. Kinne, supra note 12, at 217 (discussing US efforts to influence the political
process and policymaking specifically in developing countries).
111. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567.
112. Id.
113. Langenegger v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 229, 232 (1984), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
114. The political question doctrine does not bar judicial review of foreign takings
claims. A foreign takings claim is justiciable so long as it "seeks only a determination of
the lawfulness of the executive's deprivation of [the plaintiff's] private property without
just compensation." Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1570 (applying the holdings in Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
115. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571.
116. Kinne, supra note 12, at 238.
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117
The court developed
to trigger liability for a foreign-based taking.
this test by applying the framework set out by the Supreme Court in

Y.M.C.A. v. United States, in which plaintiffs alleged that the US
government effected a taking by depriving the plaintiffs of the use of
their private property in the Panama Canal Zone. 118 In Langenegger,
the Federal Circuit noted that the standard for government
involvement emphasized by the Court in Y.M.C.A.-"sufficiently direct
and substantial"-was significant and should guide lower courts in
evaluating whether the United States caused a deprivation or
expropriation of property in the first place. 119 It follows, therefore, that
the Langenegger test requires an inquiry into the causation of any
foreign taking to determine whether the United States caused a
deprivation or loss of property.
The court in Langenegger articulated a two-pronged analysis to
determine whether US government participation or activities
constitute "sufficiently direct and substantial" involvement in an
overseas expropriation. First, the court examined the "nature" of the

US government's activity alleged to have caused the taking. 120 The
court concluded that where US involvement amounts only to "friendly
likely does not trigger just
the expropriation
persuasion,"
compensation liability for the United States. 1 2 1 Therefore, based on the
allegations made by the plaintiffs in Langenegger, the court found that

US encouragement of El Salvador's government to implement national
land reform programs did not constitute anything more than "friendly

persuasion."1 22
Second, the court considered the amount of "benefit" received by
23
For
the US government as a result of the foreign expropriation.1
example, in Turney v. United States, where the US government sought
the return of its radar equipment and pressured Philippine authorities
to assist in its seizure from the plaintiff, the Court of Claims
determined that the plaintiffs properly alleged a taking, since the
124
In
United States secured a clear "benefit" as a result of the taking.

117. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571; see also Turney v. United States, 115 F.
Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
118. Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93
(1969) (noting that "[Iln any case where government action is causally related to private
misconduct which leads to property damage - a determination must be made whether
the government involvement in the deprivation of private property is sufficiently direct
and substantial to require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.").
119. Kinne, supra note 12, at 239 (quoting Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572).
120. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571-72 (explaining that the nature of the
governmental action is a standard factor courts consider in takings claims, both foreign
and domestic).
121. Id. at 1572.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See 115 F. Supp. 457, 465 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (holding that the plaintiff was in a
unique position for recovery even though there was no present market for resale because
the government gained an advantage by destroying the plaintiff's market and then
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contrast, in Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, the Court of
Claims found the US government not liable for a taking when its
military ordered the Japanese government to seize a private British
ship and use it to lay and repair submarine cables. 125 There, the
Japanese reaped the long-term benefits of such work, not the United
States. 1 26 In Langenegger, the court explained that where the only
benefit conferred on the federal government is the enhanced political
stability of its neighboring sovereigns, a finding of "sufficiently direct
and substantial" involvement is not justified. 1 27 The court's holding

made clear that diplomatic persuasion among allies is a common
occurrence; and as a matter of law, such a benefit cannot warrant a
finding of direct and substantial involvement here and is insufficient
to hold a defendant constructively responsible for the alleged taking. 128
Thus, both prongs-the "nature" of US activity and the public "benefit"
secured by the US government-must be satisfied in order to

demonstrate the existence of a foreign taking. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has also held "that the federal government need not
take property for its own use" in order to establish a compensable
taking.12
2. Claim Extinguishment

A claimant may also initiate an independent takings action by
demonstrating that the US government extinguished his or her
otherwise "live expropriation action" against a foreign sovereign. 130

This alternate basis for establishing a Fifth Amendment taking is
referred to as "claim extinguishment" in litigation.131 For example, the
plaintiffs in Langenegger asserted an alternative claim that the US
government's "encouragement" of El Salvador extinguished any
potential recovery

under international

law.1 32 They argued that

taking the property); see also Monroe Leigh, Expropriation-JustCompensation-Political
Question Doctrine-Responsibility of U.S. Government for Taking of U.S. Citizens'
Property by Foreign Government, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1060, 1062 (1985) (explaining that
the Claims Court used US benefit as a metric for determining whether there was a taking
in several cases).
125. 127 F. Supp. 553, 557 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
126. See Leigh, supra note 124 (explaining that the United States was not liable
for a taking because the Japanese reaped the long-term benefits, among other reasons
such that the Japanese outfitted the ship and used it daily).
127. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572.
128. Id.
129. Kinne, supra note 12, at 242. See generally Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the state legislature did not violate the public use
limitations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it permitted redistribution
of land through eminent domain to correct for an oligopoly in land ownership).
130. Kinne, supra note 12, at 238 (citing Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573).
131. For a further discussion of claim extinguishment cases resulting in takings
liability, see infra Part III.B discussing the claim in Shanghai Power Co. v. United States.
132. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573.
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extinguishing that right constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. However, the Federal Circuit held that the State

Department's refusal to enter a diplomatic settlement with El
Salvador's government did not result in claim extinguishment and that
extinguishing a claim under international law cannot amount to a
taking. 133 Accordingly, the appellate court's ruling seemed to imply
that all foreign takings claims against the US government should be

subject to, and satisfy, the two-pronged "sufficiently direct and
substantial" framework.1 34

In Langenegger, as in Anglo Chinese Shipping, the Court of
Claims concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish both the
necessary level of participation by the US government and a tangible
35
The United
benefit received by the United States in this instance.1

States' activities toward the Salvadoran government constituted
"diplomatic persuasion among allies," which was insufficient in the
eyes of the court to warrant a finding of "direct and substantial
involvement."13 6 Moreover, it was determined that expropriation by
the Salvadoran government primarily benefited the national interests

of its leaders, while the benefit of hemispheric stability attained by the
37
United States was only incidental.1

However,

the

Federal

Circuit

determined

on

appeal

that

extinguishment of plaintiffs' claims under international law could still
amount to a constitutional taking.1 3 8 But, the issue of whether a taking
occurred depended on if the claim had in fact been extinguished, a
determination that must be made "on the basis of the particular
circumstances [of each] case."1 3 9 In Langenegger, the Federal Circuit
found that El Salvador had agreed to abide by US laws authorizing
international arbitration for such claims, and that the plaintiffs could
proceed independently with an arbitration without the assistance or
approval of the US government.1 4 0 Accordingly, the appellate court
held that an international forum was still available to plaintiffs and
that their claim had thus not been extinguished.141
in
jurisprudence
of Fifth Amendment
The application
Langenegger suggests that if US claimants are able to demonstrate

133. Id.
134. Kinne, supra note 12, at 238.
135. Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553, 557 (Ct. Cl.
1955); Leigh, supra note 124.
136. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572.
137. Leigh, supra note 124.
138. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573 ("[T]he lower court's Shanghai Power decision
does not present an absolute rule that the extinguishment of a claim under international
law can never amount to a taking").
139. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 242 (1983) (quoting Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
140. See Leigh, supra note 124, at 1062-63 (citing Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, Title II, 97 Stat. 384 (1983)).
141. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1573.
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that international adjudication and resolution of their claim is
foreclosed, then they may argue in court that the United States was
responsible for extinguishing their claim. In Langenegger, however, the
plaintiffs ultimately faced considerable hurdles in proving that the US
government owed compensation for the taking, since the plaintiffs
were required to demonstrate the same two elements (the "nature" of
US activity and the "benefit" that accrued to the government) that
thwarted their initial expropriation claim. 142

C. The Scope and Limits of Recovery for a Foreign Taking
The

scope

of effective

foreign

takings

and the

amount

of

compensation for such claims that courts consider to be adequate has
evolved, especially in light of the Langenegger decision. Following the
decision in Turney, courts have maintained that a foreign taking
applies when the United States secures possession of private property

through the action of foreign sovereigns. 143 In addition, a taking can
arise because of the US government's decision to settle pending claims
with a foreign government (claim extinguishment). 144 The president of
the United States has broad, but not unlimited, authority to settle
claims against foreign sovereigns for the uncompensated taking of
property belonging to US citizens. 14 5 In claim extinguishment cases,
the U.S. Department of State, under the president's authority, acts on
behalf of US claimants to negotiate their claims with the expropriating
foreign country. 146 Per the "doctrine of espousal," negotiations are
binding and US claimants may not opt out of the settlement reached

by the US government. 147 Moreover, the settlement that is reached
constitutes the claimants' sole remedy. 148 Thus, courts have held that

142. See id. (explaining that the claim lacked substance because there was no
extinguishment).
143. Kinne, supra note 12, at 222. See also 115 F. Supp. 457, 465 (Ct. Cl. 1953)
(holding that the US benefitted from the actions of the Philippine government, so
recovery for a taking was permissible).
144. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of claim extinguishment. See also Kinne,
supra note 12, at 224 (noting that claim extinguishment actions seek compensation in
the amount that the claimant would have received if the underlying claim had not been
settled by the US government, and that such actions are related to foreign takings claims
to the extent that both are just compensation claims arising out of US foreign policy
acts).
145. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Resolving U.S. ExpropriationClaims against Cuba:
A Very Modest Proposal, 22 L. Bus. REV. AM. 3, 12 (2016). The President's authority is
limited by the rarely exercised power of Congress to enact legislation requiring that a
settlement seen as unfavorable be renegotiated. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 688-89 (1981) (holding that the President had the power to settle claims
because doing so was important to foreign relations and Congress did not object);
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 244-48 (1983) (holding that the
President's power to settle foreign claims is well established and largely self-regulated).
146. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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extinguishment of a plaintiff's claim by the government, as well as a
taking for the expropriation of a US citizen's property abroad, presents
a justiciable question for the courts.1 4 9
In past agreements negotiated by the US government on behalf of
US property owners who lost property abroad, the United States and
the expropriating country have arrived at a settlement-with payment
by the expropriating country to the United States-in an amount
usually constituting a fraction of the total estimated value of the
confiscated assets.1 50 For example, Shanghai Power, a United Statesbased corporation that at one time owned and operated a power plant
in Shanghai, China, and distributed electricity in the region, had an
expropriation claim pending against the People's Republic of China
(PRC) for the value of its confiscated power plant.151 But in 1979, the
United States (under President Carter) and the PRC agreed to
discharge and settle all outstanding claims against the PRC as part of
52
the normalization process between the two nations.1 In a subsequent
lawsuit, Shanghai Power Company contended that the US government
expropriated its property interest in violation of the Fifth Amendment
by extinguishing its claim through the treaty settlement for the excess
53
amount due for plaintiff's seized power plant.1
In Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, the Claims Court held
that the corporation's claim against the PRC constituted "property" for

purposes of the Fifth Amendment,1 54 and that the value of the seized
property (approximately $197 million) was much greater than the

149. See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a takings claim for the expropriation of a US citizen's property abroad
presents a justiciable question, and that the issue of whether the US government
extinguished the plaintiffs' claim against El Salvador was justiciable); see also
Alimanestianu v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 126, 134 (2015) (holding that a takings
claim for the expropriation of a US citizen's property in Libya pursuant to a Claims
Settlement Agreement was justiciable).
150. See Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 239-40 (explaining that the settlement
negotiated by the President would provide the plaintiff with $124 million less than Cuba
owed).
151. Id. at 239 ("In 1950, the People's Republic of China confiscated all property
within its borders belonging to U.S. nationals, including plaintiff's power plant. From
that time until 1979, when the United States normalized relations with the PRC,
plaintiff received no compensation for the loss of its property.").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 240. The US government settled US nationals' outstanding claims
against the PRC for $80.5 million, which represented about 40% of the total value of
property seized by the PRC ($197 million), as certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States. Id. at 239. See Agreement on the
1979),
(May
11,
551
I.L.M.
18
U.S.-China,
of Claims,
Settlement
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/06/27/chinaas.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PC5E-FTHT] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
154. David L. Schwartz, Belk v. United States: Obtaining Monetary Relief for
Americans Held Hostage in Iran, 4 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 207, 210, 221 (2011) (noting that
President Carter settled plaintiffs' claim for a reduced amount of $20 million for each
claimant).
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amount the plaintiffs received from the US government in the treaty
settlement ($20 million of the total $80.5 million settlement
amount).1 55 However, the court found that plaintiffs failed to establish
a cause of action that the president's settlement of its claim for a mere
fraction of its actual value amounted to a "taking."1 56 In fact, in the
court's assessment, the settlement sum of $20 million-each claimant's
pro rata share of the amounts received from the PRC-constituted
adequate compensation in this instance so as to render the taking by
claim extinguishment constitutional.1 57 It is important to recognize
that while a finding of a taking was inconclusive in Shanghai Power,
courts determine whether a compensable taking occurred by claim
extinguishment on a case-by-case basis.15 8 Here, the court deemed the
compensation award to be adequate. But despite the potential to
receive just compensation for losing one's property, the traditional
settlement negotiation process may not be adequate to satisfy the
expectations of US parties who have invested in property in Cuba.
Moreover, recent litigation has relied on Shanghai Power to
suggest that even unfiled causes of action may constitute property
interests under the Fifth Amendment.159 In ShanghaiPower, the court
interpreted the notion of Fifth Amendment property broadly, finding
that any interest will amount to "property for the purposes of the [Fifth

Amendment] unless that interest is devoid of a legally enforceable
right or recognition of a property interest would contravene public
policy."1 60 Thus, the court held that a claim for compensation, based on
foreign expropriation, satisfied this standard and "found the stage of
the claim relevant only to its value, considering factors like forum
availability and likelihood of success" to decide damages.161

Accordingly,

in a subsequent case involving a claim against the

155. Based on evidence presented by the claimants, the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commissions (FCSC) concluded that the value of the property seized was nearly $197
million, with the plaintiff's share totaling more than $144 million after interest.
Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 239 (noting that the FCSC determined that the claimants
were entitled to 6 percent simple interest from the date of the taking).
156. Id. at 249.
157. See id. at 246 n.16.
158. See id. at 242-43 (noting that the factors courts consider include the degree
to which property rights were impaired, the extent to which the property owner
benefitted from the governmental action, whether the governmental power was novel or
traditional, and whether other rights or remedies were substituted in place of the ones
lost).
159. See, e.g., Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 357, 364-66
(2015) (citing Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 240) (finding Shanghai Power instructive in
holding that the plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest in a cause of action before
a final judgment was entered); Aureus Asset Managers, Ltd. v. United States, 121 Fed.
Cl. 206, 211-13 (2015) (citing Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 240) (using ShanghaiPower
to support the conclusion that a cause of action constituted a property interest even
before a final judgment was entered).
160. Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 364 (quoting Shanghai Power, 4 Cl.
Ct. at 240).
161. Id.
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government of Libya for lost property, the Court of Claims relied on
this standard to confirm the existence of the plaintiffs' property

interest in their suit, and noted that the "finding of a property interest
in Shanghai Power" was instructive in this situation.16 2 Therefore, in
instances where claimants are excluded from recovering any
compensation, it is within the court's authority to determine whether
the government has violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition on
3
takings without due process of law or just compensation.1 6

D. Available Remedies for a Regulatory Taking
To be clear, takings claims do not always result in an award of just
compensation; other remedies are available to courts and will be
discussed later in this subpart. Regardless of the way in which the

takings action arises, if the plaintiff can establish a successful claim
against the government, the most common remedial method is to
award just compensation. 164 For example, in Turney v. United States,

the Court of Claims awarded the corporation whose radar equipment
had been seized abroad just compensation pursuant to a takings
claim. 165 While foreign sovereigns may be considered as "agents of the
[United States] in foreign takings claims such as Turney, the
Constitution does not reach the independent actions of foreign
government officials."166 Thus, in order to receive monetary

compensation, the claimant must prove that the taking effected by a
foreign government was on behalf of the US government.
In addition, compensable takings claims can arise out of direct
seizures of overseas property by the US government. For example, in
Seery v. United States, an individual US citizen whose Austrian
residence was appropriated by the US military received monetary
compensation under the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
clause. 167 Thus, it would follow that if the US government appropriated
US residents' or corporations' property in Cuba, there may be sufficient
grounds to seek monetary compensation, assuming that a proper
takings claim can be alleged and established under Langenegger's twoprong test.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 367.
164. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 145, at 11-12.
165. See 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (where the Philippine government
seized a corporation's radar equipment located in the Philippines, and turned the
equipment over to the United States).
166. Kinne, supranote 12, at 222 (citing Huther v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 916
(Ct. Cl. 1956)) (finding the United States not liable for just compensation where Canada
constructed a dam that caused flooding of plaintiffs' land).
167. See 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that an executive agreement
could not impair constitutional rights).
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But even where a foreign government's seizure of property abroad
does not lead to the US government acquiring a possessory interest in
the land, a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment may still stand.
The Court of Claims has noted that the United States could incur just
compensation liability by emboldening a foreign government to enact
a domestic policy or- program that results in the loss, damage, or
seizure of the claimant's property.1 68 Thus, by "extending the Fifth
Amendment's scope to such 'indirect' takings,"1 69 it is conceivable to
suggest that US government involvement in a foreign government's
policymaking may be sufficient to result in liability and the award of
monetary compensation for a foreign taking.
Lastly, equitable remedies such as injunctive relief or a
declaratory judgment are alternative solutions available to US courts
in connection with a foreign takings claim, if the action is not filed in
the Court of Claims.1 7 0 In order to award monetary compensation for a
foreign taking, the claim must first be adjudicated in the Court of

Claims.171 In contrast, other US courts often grant equitable relief only
after exercising the doctrine of equitable discretion to the claim.1 72 For
example, claimants before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit sought equitable relief for a taking to "prevent the
United States . . . from running military training operations on their
property," which they argued had not been lawfully expropriated.1 73
The court held that declaratory and injunctive relief constituted
appropriate remedies for a taking in this case, which would prevent US
military officers from occupying a Honduran ranch belonging to a US
entity.1 74 The federal court concluded that based on the unique

circumstances of the case, equitable relief would be an effective remedy
for the claimants and could be granted without compromising US
foreign relations with any Central American country or its military

policy in the hemisphere.1 75 Accordingly, both just compensation and
equitable relief constitute adequate methods of relief for a foreign
taking under the Fifth Amendment.

168. See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(notwithstanding El Salvador's implementation of a domestic land reform program,
"There is nothing to suggest, as the [United States government] contends, that whenever
the final act of expropriation is by the hand of a foreign sovereign, the United States
cannot be held responsible.").
169. Kinne, supra note 12, at 223.
170. Id. at 225 (noting that the U.S. Claims Court generally lacks the power to
grant equitable relief).
171. Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 30, at 549.
172. See Kinne, supra note 12, at 225 (noting that the doctrine of equitable
discretion "ensures that grants of extraordinary relief will not violate the constitutional
separation of powers," since the constitution commits control over foreign affairs actions
exclusively to the executive branch).
173. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
174. Id. at 1505.
175. Id. at 1521, 1531.
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A. Can US ClaimantsEstablish an Effective Foreign Takings Claim
in US Courts?
Do US investors and businesses have sufficient evidence to

establish a Fifth Amendment taking abroad? The answer to this
question remains ambiguous, but the relevant case law provides some
guidance. The two-prong analysis emphasized in Langenegger and
Y.M.C.A.-"sufficiently direct and substantial" US involvement in a
foreign expropriation-should be applied to Fifth Amendment taking
176
This
actions raised by US claimants for property losses in Cuba.

analysis, together with the factors emphasized in Shanghai Power,
should guide lower courts in evaluating whether the United States
caused a deprivation or expropriation of property in Cuba in the first
place. 177 It follows then that any claim would require an inquiry into

the causation of a foreign taking. If successfully established, the court
must then determine the appropriate level of compensation for the

claimants, or alternative remedies in the interests of justice ands
fairness. 178
In order to answer the question raised above, exploring a
hypothetical case may be useful. Assume, for example, that a company
like Marriott International asserts a Fifth Amendment taking against
the US government for the loss of its hotel property in Cuba as a result
of the embargo, and now the property is controlled by GAESA (the
business wing of the Cuban government). 179 First, the Court of Claims

should assess the "nature" of the US government activity alleged to

176. See, e.g., Kinne, supra note 12, at 244 (citing Langenegger v. United States,
756 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
177. See id. at 239 (explaining that the two-part test from Langenegger was
influenced by Shanghai Power).
178. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 210-11 (articulating five factors that help
identify whether justice and fairness require compensation for the plaintiffs).
179. Marriott Hotels illustrates a worthwhile hypothetical claimant in this context
because Starwood Hotels & Resorts currently holds certified claim No. CU-2-002, which
was certified by the FCSC in 2006 to be worth nearly $51.1 million (plus six percent
annual interest) for property lost in Cuba. See Jason I. Poblete, Sale, Purchase, or Other
Transfer of Certified Cuba Claims Held by U.S. Nationals, CLIENT BULL. 08-041 (Reed
Smith, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2008, at 1. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES 37-

(2016), https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/page/file/984371/download
38
[https://perma.cc/VTD9-RHV7] (archived Oct. 27, 2019); CREIGHTON UNIV. SCH. OF LAW
& DEPT OF POLITICAL SCI, REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY
CLAIMS
BETWEEN
CUBA
&
THE
UNITED
STATES
108
(2007),

2019)
Oct.
27,
visited
(last
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADK412.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HBT3-4YG4] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) [hereinafter REPORT ON
PROPERTY CLAIMS IN CUBA] (explaining that two takings claims by US citizens were
certified in August 2006 after the US government requested a second Cuban Claims
Program to adjudicate and certify takings claims against the Cuban government).
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have resulted in the taking. 180 In this context, the claimants may
assert that the Trump administration's decision to restore economic
restraints and reverse key Obama-era regulations-namely the easing
involvement in
and travel restrictions--constitutes
of trade
policymaking that ultimately led to seizure of their property.
Alternatively, a corporation such as Marriott could argue that their
property on the shoreline was expropriated by the Cuban government
pursuant to a domestic tourism development project by GAESA,
similar to the plaintiffs in Langenegger.181 In either context, the court
can interpret the notion of Fifth Amendment property broadly, finding
that any such interest will likely amount to property for the purpose of

a takings claim. 182 If there is evidence that the Cuban government had
expropriated or frozen US citizens' property at the prompting of the US
government or another foreign sovereign (for example, on the promise
of fiscal or military support), this would serve to bolster the plaintiffs'
takings claim.1 83
The determination of whether regulatory intervention by the US
government would constitute "direct and substantial" involvement is a
factually intensive inquiry left to the court's discretion. For example,
in Turney, the Court of Claims was presented with circumstances that
were sufficient to constitute a taking. 184 The taking rested upon the
court's finding that the Philippine government, persuaded by the U.S.

Army's desire to repossess its radar equipment, placed an embargo on
the exportation of the radar which thus amounted to direct and
substantial US involvement.1 8 5 But in Langenegger, the court asserted
that where the actual expropriation is carried out by a foreign
sovereign, the involvement is not "direct and substantial," and the
United States is not responsible for a taking where its activity merely
amounts to "'friendly' persuasion regarding general policy."1 86 These
decisions suggest that a US court will likely acknowledge that
diplomatic persuasion among adversarial nations is a common
occurrence, and as a matter of law, cannot be deemed sufficiently
irresistible to warrant a finding of direct and substantial involvement.

Such "nebulous forms of United States influence" are insufficient to

180. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
181. Id. at 1567.
182. See Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 357, 364-67 (2015)
(citing Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 240) (holding that courts have the power to find a
cognizable property interest in a cause of action that does not yet have a final judgment).
183. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567 (explaining that action by another
sovereign may constitute a taking by the US government when in response to irresistible
pressure to come to the terms of the United States).
184. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (finding a
taking and forcing the corporation to exchange the radar for just compensation).
185. Id. (holding that the United States government was functionally taking the
property because the US placed irresistible pressure on the Philippine government to
act).
186. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572.
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make a governmental-defendant constructively responsible for the
alleged taking. 187 Accordingly, the US government could potentially
assert that any property seizures or economic restrictions abroad
initiated by the Cuban government (in response to the embargo)
amount only to "friendly persuasion" in the diplomatic context or
indirect lobbying by the US, which would not be enough to trigger just

compensation liability. 188 Ultimately, the core of a successful Fifth
Amendment taking may depend on a court's interpretation of "friendly

persuasion" as it relates to domestic policy initiatives.
In addressing whether a taking has occurred, the court should also
examine the "benefit" that accrued to the United States as a result of
the alleged taking of Marriott's property and the tightening of
restrictions in Cuba.1 8 9 In Turney, the benefit to the United States was
clear: the U.S. Army reacquired the radar it mistakenly had sold.1 90
But in Langenegger, the court held that the claimed "benefit of

hemispheric

stability" attained

by the United States was only

incidental to the foreign sovereign's expropriation, and was not for the

United States' public benefit.191 Accordingly, a claimant such as
Marriott would need to articulate a benefit beyond just "regional
stability." For instance, plaintiffs could argue that the US government
obtains a clear benefit by reinstituting the economic embargo-for
example, attaining greater economic control over a communist regime,
garnering public support and enhanced credibility from human rights
advocates for reestablishing restrictions in response to human rights
violations by the Cuban government, or gaining a bargaining
advantage in future sanctions negotiations. However, Langenegger's
holding makes clear that where the sole benefit to the United States
amounts to "enhanced political stability of [a] neighboring sovereign, a
finding of 'sufficient direct and substantial' involvement is not
warranted."1 92 As such, the benefit obtained by achieving political
stability or control in the region may be meritless-Cuba does not
present a significant military or nuclear threat at the moment and does

not threaten US policy in Latin America or the Caribbean.1 9 3 Thus,

187. Id. (quoting Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 592 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
188. See id. (noting that US backing and encouragement of a domestic policy
proposal in El Salvador to implement land reforms did not rise above the level of
"friendly persuasion").
189. Id. at 1572-73.
190. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 463 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
191. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567, 1572.
192. See, e.g., Kinne, supra note 12, at 239 (citing Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572).
193. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 14, 42 (2019) (statement of Daniel
R. Coats, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf [https://perma.ccIW3GP-APSE] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (observing
that Cuba presents very minimal threats to the US in 2019). See also Mimi Whitefield,
Trump officials say Cuba meddles in Venezuela, but Havana almost ignored in threat
report, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
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without satisfying both prongs-the "nature" of the US activity and the
"benefit" received by the US government-it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for US companies like Marriott to demonstrate the
existence of a regulatory taking for foreign expropriation of property in
Cuba. The lack of a true "benefit" accrued by the US government will
more than likely prove fatal for any Fifth Amendment takings claim.
In the alternative, however, if a court does find that plaintiff's
claim constitutes property under the Fifth Amendment, the court must
then determine what amount satisfies just compensation-assuming

the claimant has yet to be compensated.1 94 In deciding whether justice
and fairness require that a claimant receives compensation for the

taking of their property in Cuba, lower courts can look to Shanghai
Power. In that case, the Court of Claims relied on five factors to assess
the nature of compensation: (1) the degree to which the government
impaired the property owner's rights; (2) the extent to which the
property owner was an incidental beneficiary of the governmental
action; (3) the importance of the public interest that the governmental
action would serve; (4) whether the governmental action was novel or
unexpected, or fell within traditional boundaries; and (5) whether the
governmental action substituted any rights or remedies for those that
it destroyed.1 95 In considering the factors above, if no triable issue of

fact exists for the court, the five elements may still be evaluated to
determine if, as a matter of law, compensation is in the interest of
justice and fairness.1 96 In considering a Fifth Amendment taking of US
corporate property seized in Cuba, lower courts should apply this fivepart takings analysis together with Langenegger'stwo-pronged test as
a guide to determine whether a taking of property occurred without
just compensation. 197
With regard to property loss in Cuba, the US government's
decision to reinstate the embargo with Cuba was likely unexpected for
many US parties, at least when the property investments had been
made by US nationals and before the election of President Trump.
Therefore, it is certainly possible that a takings claim by US nationals
or corporations for lost property rights in Cuba could rise to the level
of a constitutional taking under the application of past takings
decisions. Alternatively, it may also be the case that by reimposing the
embargo on US companies that once did business in Cuba, the US

world/world/americas/cuba/article225365020.html
[https://perma.cc/7CRU-FXS6]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019) ("Cuba got scant attention in the U.S. intelligence community's
2019 'Worldwide Threat Assessment' and there was no mention of the threat of a CubaVenezuela nexus.").
194. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1569.
195. Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 242-43 (1983).
196. Schwartz, supranote 154, at 210-13.
197. See Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1567; see also Schwartz, supra note 154, at 210
(explaining that courts use the two-part test to evaluate justiciability and the five-part
test to determine whether a taking occurred).
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government substituted the rights of US citizens based on their
regulatory expectations. Given this analysis, it is more likely than not

that a US court would not dismiss a US claimant's takings claim
outright, and that the government's motion to dismiss-assuming a
claimant could meet the evidentiary threshold-would likely fail.

While the issue of property loss in Cuba is not currently a case of claim
extinguishment by the US government, as property owners have not
yet received compensation and no "live expropriation" has been

quashed yet, a court could still rely on the five-part analysis set forth
in ShanghaiPower as a guide to determine whether a taking occurred
198
without just compensation.

B. Alternative InternationalFrameworksfor US Claimants without
the Langenegger Test
If a court should decide to reject a petitioner's takings claim as
insufficient, or dismiss it entirely, there remain several alternatives

available to property owners. US claimants seeking compensation for
their loss of property in Cuba as a result of the current embargo would

likely have at least three options for compensation or settlement: (1)
filing suit and litigating in a Cuban court; (2) obtaining noncash
compensatory remedies; and (3) pursuing legal action under Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act. It is important to add that while this Note has
not focused on these other approaches in significant detail up until this

point, these domestic and international remedies available to US
claimants are widely discussed by numerous US and international law
scholars in other works, and thus have not served as the basis of
extensive analysis in this Note.1 99
First, in place of filing a takings claim in the Court of Claims, a
US citizen could bring an action for compensation in a Cuban court.
Given the potential flood of litigation on issues such as property rights,

Cuba could establish courts of limited jurisdiction to hear these
200
specialized matters and ease the burden on regular Cuban courts.

198. See 4 Cl. Ct. at 242-43 (suggesting that a government may be liable for a
taking when acting as an arbiter if it frustrates investment expectations).
199. See, e.g., Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba:
TransformingTrauma Into Opportunity, LATIN AM. INITIATIVE AT THE BROOKINGS INST.
(Dec. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-USProperty-Claims-in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMA7-T7W4] (archived Oct.
27, 2019); Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriationof Property in Cuba: A Historical and
Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-Socialist
Cuba, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321, 342 (2000) (suggesting multiple possible
restitution schemes for different claimants); Morales, supra note 58, at 16 (identifying
several key points for discussion about possible remedies for US Claimants against
Cuba).
200. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Armando A. Musa, Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
in a Post-TransitionCuba, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 125, 125 (2006). Travieso-Diaz and
Musa note that as Cuba progresses closer toward a free-market society, there will arise
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While Cuban law would allow this, current US regulations would
require a US citizen to obtain a license from the U.S. Department of
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to travel to
Havana for this purpose. 20 1 Even if the government granted the
property holder a license, a plaintiff would be required to retain local
counsel and endure lengthy litigation in order to establish legal rights
to compensation. 2 02 The Cuban government would then need to make
a determination as to the value of the claim. 2 03 If the action proves
successful, the land owner would most likely receive sovereign bonds
(rather than cash) as compensation for the property seized or lost.204
As a result, pursuing local action in Cuba for the loss of property may
prove challenging and ultimately is not likely to be successful.

Alternatively, corporations that have lost private property as a
result of the embargo and its associated restrictions may be able to
seek payment in ways that do not involve the transfer of cash or bonds.
In 1981-1982, following the Iran Hostage Crisis, the United States
agreed to cease all litigation against Iran and release Iranian assets
frozen by the Carter administration.2 0 5 As part of this process, the

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established to resolve US
nationals' expropriation claims against Iran. 206 By establishing a
similar Cuba-United States claims tribunal, which could have legal
authority as an arbitral body, US claimants could be awarded remedies
in the form of tax credits, development rights, and other incentives to
invest in property in the new Cuba. 20 7 This framework could be
employed if the two governments agree in advance to a procedure
analogous to that used by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

One key feature of the Iran-United States Tribunal was its
adoption of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law's Arbitration Rules, which address international commercial

"a need to create specialized tribunals to handle disputes in areas such as taxation,
bankruptcy, and intellectual property." Id.
201. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(7)(B), 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2018) (explaining
liability for trafficking in confiscated property claimed by US nationals).
202. Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely
Settlement Mechanisms, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 413, 425 (2009).
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a) (2018) (listing the various types of property
interests available).
205. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 207-08.
206. Id. at 218. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had legal authority to arbitrate
unresolved US and Iranian private commercial claims against one another relating to
contracts or debts. Decisions of the tribunal were final and binding on the parties. Id. at
207-08. For a further discussion on this topic, see Peter W. Adler, Note, The U.S.-Iran
Accords and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. REv. 1537, 1539-40
(1982) [hereinafter Adler, U.S.-Iran Accords].
207. REPORT ON PROPERTY CLAIMS IN CUBA, supra note 179, at 5-6, 146; see also
Marco Antonio Duenas, Chartinga New Course in Cuba? Why the Time is Now to Settle
Outstanding American Property Claims, 43 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 545, 568-69 (2018)
(suggesting possible remedies in a US-Cuba Claims Tribunal).
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arbitration procedures.2 0 8 However, one significant impediment to
establishing a tribunal to adjudicate disputes between a US claimant
and the government of Cuba would be crafting a provisional agreement
whereby Cuba promises to guarantee government funds to satisfy
tribunal awards. 2 09 This proposal has been advanced in the past by
Cuban Americans with uncertified claims whose property was seized
as a result of Castro's nationalization campaign. Nevertheless, it would

stand to reason that such an approach could also aid current US
claimants who have lost property and are seeking compensation due to
210

the embargo's reinstatement.
A second possibility that exists in place of a takings claim is the
option to buy claimants' property interests at a discount from the
original property owner, and then use those property claims to broker
a private settlement with the Cuban government. 2 11 This approach,
which would require a negotiated group settlement, remains legally
feasible-as long as it is carried out by the US government in
accordance with existing law. 212 From a policy standpoint, both of

these noncash compensatory remedies would offer modest victories for
US property owners as well as for the Cuban government-they would
compensate current US claimants who allege a foreign taking while
simultaneously stimulating the Cuban economy.
Lastly, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act may provide a property

holder, whose takings claim fails and who does not possess a US
certified claim,2 13 with an alternative course of action to recover lost
property in Cuba that is perhaps the most likely to succeed. Title III
authorizes US companies and nationals to sue the Cuban government
in US federal court for "trafficking" in property "nationalized,
expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government on or after
January 1, 1959."214 This includes penalizing foreign companies that
currently profit from Cuban property formerly owned by US nationals,
but which was confiscated by the Cuban government following the

208. See Adler, U.S.-Iran Accords, supranote 206, at 1539 n.13.
209. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 145, at 19-20 (suggesting that Cuba would
need to set up an independent fund for tribunal awards).
210. See Duenas, supra note 207, at 555-56 (explaining the Cuban nationalization
process of US interests in the 1950s and 1960s).
211. Ashby, supra note 202.
212. Id.
213. The term "US certified claim" refers to claims of US nationals against the
Cuban government that have been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) at the Department of Justice under Title V of the International
Settlement Claims Act of 1949. See Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, https://www.justice.gov/fesc/claims-against-cuba (last visited
Feb. 26, 2019) [https:/perma.cc/W5JY-G6JP] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). A claim holder
may obtain compensation for a certified claim through a bilateral settlement agreement
between the United States and Cuba, whereby Cuba agrees to settle the claim. See id.
214. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000).
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1959 revolution. 2 15 Importantly, litigation would not be limited to the
5,913 certified claimants whose Cuban property rights have already
been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. 216
Rather, the filings could be made by nearly anyone with potential
claims to lost property in Cuba, including individuals who are of Cuban

descent but were not yet born when their parents or grandparents'
assets were expropriated by the Cuban government decades ago. 217
Stated simply, what is currently limited to 5,913 certified claims could
quickly become hundreds of thousands of potential claims. 218
Title III, incorporated into the embargo in 1996, consists of a
provision that allows US presidents to suspend Title III every six

months. 2 19 Since President Bill Clinton, every US president has
suspended the clause due to the negative diplomatic and legal effects
that such claims could have on the Cuban economy and the US court
system. 22 0 However, on April 17, 2019, in a surprising move that
departed from the US government's twenty-three year tradition of
suspending the provision, the Trump administration announced that

it would activate Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. 221 The decision to
activate the 1996 provision authorizes a private cause of action in US
courts and allows any Cuban American whose land was nationalized
or confiscated by the Cuban government after 1959 to sue any person
or company who "traffics" or economically benefits from their
previously held property. 222
The immediate effect of this policy shift remains uncertain at the

time of publishing this Note. The administration's decision to activate
Title III means that the US government will now allow lawsuits in US
courts against foreign companies that use property confiscated by the

215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S., supra note 212.
217. See Memo from NSC to POTUS: This Week for Title III Suspension;
Capitulate, Incapacitateor Negotiate?, U.S.-CUBA TRADE & ECON. COUNCIL: ECON. EYE
ON CUBA (July 11, 2017), https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/7/11/memo-from-ns-topotus-this-week-for-title-iii-suspension-capitulate-incapacitate-ornegotiate?rq=certified%20claims [https://perma.cc/PFG8-YE89] (archived Oct. 27, 2019)
(suggesting that a large number of litigants could be reached by Title III).
218. Id.
219. Paul Guzzo, U.S. Might Allow Lawsuits Over U.S. Properties Nationalized in
Cuba, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/news/cubalusmight-allow-lawsuits-over-us-properties-nationalized-in-cuba-20190117/
[https://perma.cc/G4TJ-7T5T] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
220. Austin Klawitter, Trump Administration Considering Plan to Scare Off
Investors
in
Cuba,
THE
GLOBE
POST
(Jan.
28,
2019),
https://theglobepost.com/2019/01/28/cuba-us-property-rights/
[https://perma.cc/BQ8VNU2Y] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
221. William M. LeoGrande, Trump Declares Economic War on Cuba, THE
CONVERSATION (Apr. 18, 2019), http://theconversation.com/trump-declares-economicwar-on-cuba-115672 [https://perma.cc/9S8Y-7SRZ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
222. Id. The author notes that most Cuban Americans will gain nothing from
Trump's latest sanctions decision against Cuba because Title III exempts private
residences from seeking compensation. Id.
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Cuban government after the Cuban Revolution sixty years ago. 223
Lifting the long-frozen clause will certainly have a considerable impact
in US courts and has already resulted in a flurry of new litigation
224
Title III requires
against US, European, and Canadian companies.
seized the
or
otherwise
nationalized
either
government
Cuban
that the
225
over
no
jurisdiction
have
US
courts
Normally,
in
question.
property
a
foreign
by
nationalized
was
that
by
noncitizens
owned
property
government, as that would constitute a challenge to that government's
sovereignty.2 2 6 But under Title III, the statute's expansive
extraterritorial application allows for lawsuits against foreign
companies engaged in business deemed lawful in Cuba, in their home
countries, and under international law to be subject to US
jurisdiction. 227 For example, in May 2019 members of the Mata family
(now Cuban-Americans) filed a claim in US federal court against the
Spanish hotel company Melii Hotels seeking compensation for its use

of the beachfront hotel (since renamed the Melid San Carlos). 228 The
Cuban government confiscated the San Carlos Hotel in December 1962

from the Mata family, one of the wealthiest families in Cuba at the
time. 229 The Mata family is also suing Trivago, a subsidiary of the
online-booking company Expedia Inc., for "unlawful trafficking" in
their family's hotel property and to recover commissions, fees and.,
other remuneration earned via Trivago's business dealings involving
the hotel. 23 0 In another possible case, former owners of Cuba's nickel

223. Matt Spetalnick & Sarah Marsh, In Major Shift, Trump to Allow Lawsuits
Against
Foreign
Firms
in
Cuba,
REUTERS,
Apr.
16,
2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba/in-major-shift-trump-to-allow-lawsuits[https://perma.c/6ZEV-YRJD]
against-foreign-firms-in-cuba-idUSKCN1RS1VY
(archived Jan. 21, 2020).
224. Dylan Jackson, Attorneys Prepare to File Lawsuits on Behalf of CubanAmericans Whose Property Was Confiscated by Castro, LAW.cOM: DAILY Bus. REV. (Mar.
6, 2019), https://www.law.comldailybusinessreview/2019/03/06/attorneys-prepare-tofile-lawsuits-on-behalf-of-cuban-americans-whose-property-was-confiscated-by-castro/
(subscription required) [https://perma.cc/7U48-NLWZ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
225. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000).
226. LeoGrande, supra note 221.
227. Jackson, supra note 224.
228. Nora Gamez Torres, Spanish Melid Company May Be Sued in U.S. Over Its
Use of Confiscated Hotel in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (May 20, 2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article230624529.html
[https://perma.cc/7JSQ-D799] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
229. Hank Tester, Miami Family Suing Cuban Government, Spanish Hotel Chain
Over Business Confiscated by Castro Regime in 1960's, CBS MIAMI (May 20, 2019),
https://miami.cbslocal.com/2019/05/20/miami-family-suing-cuban-government-businessconfiscated-castro-regime [https://perma.cc/6QWJ-EVUD] (archived Oct. 27, 2019);
Gamez Torres, supra note 228.
230. Jonathan Levin, Exiles Sue Expedia's Trivago for 'Trafficking' in Cuban
2
Property, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 01906-19/exiles-sue-expedia-s-trivago-for-trafficking-in-cuban-property
[https://perma.cc/3247-EJQT] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). See also Class Action Complaint

364

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL.-53:329

mines could seek damages from Sherritt International, a Canadian
corporation, which has invested and trafficked in Cuba's nickel mining
industry in recent years. 231

Several other lawsuits have also recently been filed as a result of
Title III's activation. In May 2019, Havana Docks Corporation filed
suit in the Southern District of Florida against US cruise company
Carnival ('Carnival Cruise Lines') for trafficking in Plaintiff's
confiscated property in Cuba-commercial waterfront property in the
Port of Havana known as the "Havana Cruise Port Terminal." 232
Plaintiff-the former owner of Havana's ports-alleges that Carnival
knowingly and intentionally trafficked in the confiscated property, and
profited from it, by regularly taking its passengers to and from
Havana's port without the authorization of the plaintiff or any US
national who holds a claim to the harbor. 2 33 Similarly, ExxonMobil has
filed suit in US federal court against two Cuban companies for their
illicit use of an oil refinery in Havana and other properties seized six

decades ago. 234 According to one U.S. State Department report,
"implementing Title III could flood US federal courts with as many as
200,000 lawsuits" and thus raises heightened concerns for both US

courts and policymakers. 235 Ultimately, every US and foreign company
that does business with Cuba-now or in the future-risks being sued
under Title III if they make use of property once owned by a Cuban
exile who is now a US citizen. 236
So, as a result of Title III's activation, who wins? One group of
winners is Cuba's "former one percenters," a small class consisting of

for Damages at 2, Mata et al. v. Trivago GmbH, No. 1:19-cv-22529 (S.D. Fla. June 18,
2019).
231. LeoGrande, supra note 221.
232. Complaint at 3, Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-CV-21724
(S.D. Fla. May 2, 2019). The property that is the subject of the claim was confiscated and
nationalized by the Cuban government on Oct 24, 1960. Id.
233. Id. In response, Carnival maintains that the plaintiff has failed to plead
"trafficking" under Helms-Burton because it has not plausibly shown that Carnival's
"use of the property was not incident to lawful travel" to Cuba and its use of the Havana
Docks was "necessary to the conduct of such travel." Carnival Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint & Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 3, 11, Havana Docks Corp. v.
Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-CV-21724 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2019). Moreover, Carnival
disputes whether plaintiff even owns a real claim over the 'trafficked' property. Id.
234. Nora Gdmez Torres, ExxonMobil Sues Cuba's Oil Companies for Their Use of
Properties Seized
under
Castro,
MIAMI
HERALD
(May
5,
2019),
https://www. miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article23000970
9.html [https://perma.cc/8F4D-56E2] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (discussing recent lawsuits
filed against Cuban companies CIMEX and CUPET).
235. U.S. Dep't of State, Settlement of Outstanding United States Claims to
Confiscated Property in Cuba, Report to Congress Under Section 207of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Sept. 1996); Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th
Congress,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.
R44822
72-73
(Jan.
15,
2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44822
[https://perma.cc/5US9-3NMP]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019).
236. LeoGrande, supra note 221.
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Cuba's exiled wealthy elite that owned a majority of the land and
business in Cuba prior to the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 237 These wealthy
Cubans fled the country after Castro's communist regime nationalized
their businesses and confiscated their bank accounts and property. As
a result of Title III's activation, they can now sue Cuban, American,
and foreign entities that profit in any way from the use of that land.

On the other end of the spectrum are the majority of Cuban Americans
who stand to gain nothing from the administration's new sanctions
against Cuba. Because Title III exempts private residences from
compensation, there is no statutory remedy for US citizens who seek
restitution for the loss of their house confiscated after January 1, 1959.
As William LeoGrande points out, "[t]he exiled owners of thousands of
small Cuban mom-and-pop shops nationalized in 1968 [also] won't see
compensation . . . because the law exempts Cuban small businesses
that were confiscated." 238 Thus for now, it appears that the
administration's action will likely serve to further divide Cuba's exiled
communities.

Does Title III's new flood of litigation resolve the question of a
potential regulatory taking in Cuba? Although the law on its face
would not appear to apply to alleged takings of property investments

made by US nationals between 2014 and 2019, if a US company or
citizen could prove that one of its properties has been expropriated by
a Cuban or foreign entity-and that this action took place after
President Trump's decision to reinstate the embargo-it is possible
there may be a basis for legal action under Title III. Notwithstanding
the Trump administration's decision to activate the clause, Title III
does not explicitly prevent the possibility of takings relief for such
claimants; rather, it merely requires that such claimants prove that
their property in Cuba has been expropriated or otherwise taken some
time after January 1, 1959. With conclusive evidence proving this, it is
plausible that claimants could try to seek relief in US courts under
Title III from those who are "trafficking" in their confiscated property
in Cuba. 23 9 Now that the US government has lifted the twenty-three
year suspension of Title III, lawsuits like the ones involving Carnival
and Marriott will continue to roll into US courts across the nation-a
warning sign that may scare off foreign investors from entering the
Cuban market as well as alarm current investors who are profiting
from confiscated land in Cuba. As such, a Fifth Amendment taking
alleged by Marriott or another similarly situated US plaintiff may not
be completely out of the question.

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. (suggesting that up to 200,000 lawsuits could be filed in federal court
under Article II because any company doing business with Cuba could be sued for using
property that was nationalized by the Cuban government since 1956).
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V. CONCLUSION

The US government's decision to reinstate the economic embargo
against Cuba in 2017 may have significant legal consequences for US
claimants who hold property rights in Cuba as well as for the US
government. Under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, if a
government has expropriated one's property, a taking may be justified
whereby a claimant may seek his constitutional right to just
compensation. 240 In addition to direct takings of US property overseas,

the Fifth Amendment's scope has been extended to include "indirect"
takings of property by foreign governments, suggesting that a court
may hold the United States liable for a foreign taking simply by
encouraging foreign governments to adopt domestic policies or
programs that result in the seizure of a US claimant's property. 24 1
However, if a court concludes that a US claimant has not satisfied the
two-pronged test necessary to demonstrate a foreign taking, 2 42 there
remain several alternatives available to US claimants seeking
compensation for property losses in Cuba, the most prominent of which
is to pursue legal action under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. 243 If
takings claims are alleged and upheld as a result of this regulatory
decision, the United States will undoubtedly face future takings
challenges stemming from its trade policies or those of other
sovereigns. Moreover, any litigation resulting from this shift in policy
would undoubtedly require the United States to consider the impact
and costs of future takings challenges when deciding whether to adopt
certain policy positions or enforce key regulatory actions.
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